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Abstract: 
During the last decade, Argentine soybean production showed a high rate of innovation, as farmers 
adopted state of the art technologies associated with biotechnology without important lags regarding their 
international launch. This sector’s high speed of assimilation of global innovations contrasted notoriously 
with the pattern observed for the rest of tradable activities. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to 
identify the factors that impelled soybean’s development and draw lessons for the rest of the local 
economy. On this matter, this paper states that soybean production has been able to surpass usual 
domestic innovative restrictions due to its organization in network systems, that imply coordination 
between such diverse actors as farmers, suppliers, clients, investors, workers, technicians and science and 
technology institutions. Besides, this paper examines microeconomic positive consequences of local 
introduction of GMOs (on yields, production and exports) and, also, its crucial role for recent Argentine 
macroeconomic sustainability (fiscal and commercial surpluses). Finally, this paper reviews the topics in 
which this innovative process has failed (lower incidence of national suppliers of inputs, machines and 
knowledge and scarce advances in value added creation). To achieve all mentioned purposes, different 
sources of information will be utilized and processed, such as National Innovation Surveys and local and 
international databases. 
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International comparisons reveal that innovation investment is relatively weak in 
Argentina (Table I.1): the share of national Research and Development (R+D) 
expenditure in local GDP was slightly above 0,5% in 2007, percentage that was not only 
inferior to the figures of developed nations like Japan (3,39% in 2006), the United 
States (2,62% in 2006) and Germany (2,51% in 2005) but, also, to the rates of emergent 
economies like Brazil (1,02% in 2006), Chile (0,68% in 2004) and China (1,42% in 
2006). Additionally, in the mentioned year, Argentine private sector was only 
responsible for 30% of total domestic R+D disbursement, behavior that notoriously 
contrasted with the ones observed in both OCDE countries and the rest of the main 
Latin American nations. 
TABLE I.1. 
R+D EXPENDITURE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES. VARIOUS YEARS. 


















Source: based on data from OCDE and RICYT. 
Nevertheless, the previous comparison on innovation has two limitations. First, the 
weak Argentine R+D expenditure is a result of an innovation pattern based on the 
acquisition of incorporated knowledge. In this respect, domestic industry destines the 
bulk of its innovative investment (54% in 2004) to the purchase of machineries and 
equipment, pattern associated with agents whose technological development is sustained 
by exogenous sources and, thus, act as followers of the knowledge developed by 
(usually foreign) competitors and providers1 (Peirano, 2006). 
Besides, comparatively low R+D expenditure in Argentina is partially a result of a 
productive configuration in which high-tech activities (e.g. machinery, transport 
                                                          
1 This strategy, shared by Brazil and Portugal, reveals an innovative dynamics that fails to take advantage 
of internal sources of knowledge creation like R+D (Lugones et al, 2005). On the contrary, French, Dutch 
and, to a lesser extent, German manufacturing firms mainly allocate their innovation budget to R+D 
activities. In both cases, said agents are not only over the international technological frontier but, 
frequently, are responsible for expanding the global state of the art. 
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equipment and precision instruments’ manufacturing) have a radically smaller incidence 
than in developed nations2 (Chudnovsky et al, 2006). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the previous analysis fails to assess that, although a 
vast fraction of Argentine tradable activities are notoriously below international 
standards on said subject3, a few local key sectors in terms of their share in domestic 
GDP, employment, exports and fiscal revenues were able to adopt state of the art 
technologies and, exceptionally, expand the global knowledge frontier (Bernat and 
Corso, 2008). 
Regarding the latter, national agriculture was amongst the first to replicate the 
international state of the art “jump” that occurred in the middle nineties and that was 
associated with the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in said 
activity. In fact, the amount of hectares sowed with transgenic plants in Argentina 
during 2008 (21,0 million) was only surpassed by the United States (62,5 million), 
creator of this technology (Table I.2). In that way, domestic farmers exceeded the rest of 
the main international agriculture producers in terms of their usage of GMOs: Brazil 
(15,8 million), India (7,6), Canada (7,6) and the European Union. 
TABLE I.2. 
UTILIZATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS BY VARIOUS NATIONS. 2008. 












Source: Based on data from ISAAA (2009). 
In 2005, only a decade after this new technology was internationally made available, 
99% of Argentine soybean production utilized GMOs, percentage that exceeded both 
United States’ figures and, with the exception of Uruguay, the rest of the main 
producers’ performance (Figure I.1). Thus, national soybean farmers’ behavior has been 
considerably dynamic regarding their adoption of GMOs, rapidly placing them above 
the global state of the art. In fact, GM soybean’s adoption in Argentina constitutes a 
                                                          
2 Nevertheless, only 32% of the difference between Brazilian and Argentine industrial R+D investments 
in 2001 and 2000, respectively, was explained by diversity regarding manufacturing structures between 
both countries, whereas the remaining 68% was based on asymmetrical expenditures within each activity 
(Sánchez et al, 2006). 
3 Argentina’s comparatively low innovation expenditure is notoriously concentrated in high and medium-
high-tech manufacturing sectors and, to a lesser extent, in apple production and bovine cattle breeding. 
This pattern conspires against the convergence of said activities towards international state of the art, 
since it is indeed those branches that suffer the greater gap and, even worse, involve product and process 
technologies that evolve continuously world-wide. 
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world-wide example regarding a rapid large scale implementation of this new 
technology (Vicién, 2003). 
FIGURE I.1. 
UTILIZATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED SOYBEAN SEEDS BY MAIN WORLD–WIDE 
PRODUCERS. 2005. 
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Source: Based on data from Brookes and Barfoot (2006). 
As a result, between 1996 and 2008, the primary production of soybean grew from 12,5 
million tons to 46,2 million, whereas exports (including beans, oil and other sub 
products) increased from 12,1 million tons to 39,9 million. Hence, in only a decade, 
Argentina was transformed into the leading exporter of soybean oil and flour, 
conforming the main world-wide pool of oilseed production in the environs of Rosario, 
Santa Fe. In sum, soybean production has attained high rates of growth, is fully 
integrated with international markets, displays a differentiated pattern of innovative 
activities and has developed a complex structure of contracts that is very difficult to find 
in the rest of the economy. 
Precisely, the objective of this paper is, first (Section II), to study the main causes that 
determine the innovative performance in Argentine soybean production, evidence that 
shall become significantly illuminating in order to understand how this sector has 
surpassed the usual obstacles that local firms from other tradable activities have to deal 
with and that are engendered and/or deepened by a volatile macroeconomic 
environment. Later (Section III), this paper will examine the micro consequences of the 
local introduction of GMOs on yields, production and exports and, also, the former’s 
crucial role for recent Argentine macroeconomic sustainability (fiscal and commercial 
surpluses). Finally (Section IV), this paper will review the topics in which this 
innovative process has failed. To achieve all mentioned purposes, different sources of 
information on the subject will be utilized and processed, such as National Innovation 
Surveys and local and international databases. 
In this paper we take neither a purely macroeconomic nor a exclusively microeconomic 
approach, but a mixture of the two. More precisely, we consider that the decentralized 
decisions of economic units regarding investment and technological change (that is, 
microeconomics) is determined simultaneously with the characteristics and the 
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performance of the aggregate economy (macroeconomics). To this end we need to 
detect whether causation runs in both directions: (a) from macroeconomics to 
microeconomics, we will take into account that macro volatility and shocks are decisive 
to defining the (micro)economic structure; (b) from microeconomics to 
macroeconomics, we will analyze how the evolution of the economic structure affects 
macro sustainability. 
Last, but not least, it is important to emphasize that this paper is framed within the 
evolutionary school. Therefore, it does not suppose that Argentine farmers’ innovative 
strategies are derived from maximizing behaviors, as neoclassic theory of growth would 
state (Solow, 1957), but that the former are a result of selection processes in which 
historical and institutional factors, incomplete information and uncertainty acquire a 
crucial role (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1991; Katz, 2000). 
 
II. SOYBEAN PRODUCERS’ “RECIPE” FOR SURPASSING INNOVATION 
OBSTACLES: 
The rapid adoption of GMOs by local soybean producers constitutes a profoundly 
relevant case study, as it took place in a notoriously volatile macroeconomic 
environment. Usually, in Argentina, innovation’s weak performance is strongly related 
to the rise in risk perception that constant changes in macroeconomic regimes engender 
(Bernat, 2006). In those situations, local agents, especially manufacturing SMEs, prefer 
to delay their investment decisions in order to make a profounder analysis of new 
macroeconomic “rules of the game”. 
In that respect, literature on investment irreversibility (Pindyck, 1988; Caballero, 1991; 
Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; among others) determines that, in highly volatile 
economies like Argentina, prevailing uncertainty forbids the accomplishment of 
investment projects. The former is based on the hypothesis that if investments can be 
delayed, companies are enticed to adopt “waiting and seeing” strategies, avoiding 
immediate expenditures in endeavors of uncertain returns (Kosacoff and Ramos, 2006). 
Therefore, possibility of waiting becomes a central component in the process of 
evaluating when to invest. 
In fact, the option value of delaying projects is comparatively greater in volatile 
economies and, accordingly, so is the threshold yield companies demand to carry out 
investments (Caballero and Pindyck, 1996). These habitually denominated “defensive 
strategies” affect innovative projects with a considerably greater intensity, since the 
latter include costs, maturation periods and risks clearly superior to the rest of 
investments. 
Contradicting the evidence presented previously, domestic soybean producers’ fast 
adoption of herbicide tolerant varieties started in 1996/1997, in spite of the increase in 
interest rates, of the tightening of credit restrictions and of the fall of international prices 
that occurred in said period. In that deteriorated and more volatile macro and global 
context, farmers had to face accumulated commercial and financial debts, that had been 
engendered by the need to catch up with the “green revolution4” in the early nineties, 
with diminished gains. 
                                                          
4 The “green revolution” was associated with the increase in the use of agrochemicals, fertilizers and 
machineries. 
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Precisely, soybean cultivators implemented a “forward exit” (Bisang, 2001) as they 
assimilated GMOs in order to reduce their costs, augment their yields, improve 
cultivars’ management and to enable both a double-reaping in the same year (usually, 
wheat in early summer and soybean in autumn) and the expansion of this oilseed 
towards areas of smaller productivity, restoring their profit margins and, therefore, 
enabling the repayment of contracted debts. 
Also, GMOs were complementary of the “direct sowing” technique (DST), that had 
been introduced domestically during the early nineties, as it demanded the intensive use 
of the herbicide glyphosate and fertilizers. Synthetically, the DST consists in the 
implantation of oilseeds and cereals in a single procedure, avoiding surface tillage and 
associated tasks. 
The DST augmented farmers’ profits even further, as it allowed for costs reduction (by 
eliminating activities that were needed in the previous productive system), for laboring 
cycle diminution (promoting “double sowing” and the expansion towards newer areas) 
and for both an improvement in soil’s humidity (Penna  and Lema, 2002) and the long 
term agronomic sustainability (Crovetto, 2001). Therefore, the percentage of surface 
sowed with soybeans through DST grew from 27,8% in the 1994/1995 campaign to 
80,6% in 2005/2006 (Figure II.1). 
FIGURE II.1. 
DIRECT SOWING TECHNIQUE’S INCIDENCE IN SOYBEAN CULTIVATION. 1989-2006. 






























































































Source: Based on data from AAPRESID. 
Diverse studies indicate that GMOs (frequently combined with DST) resulted in gain’s 
increase superior to 10% in relation to the previous productive model. On this matter, 
Bisang (2001) states that, in 1997, the cost of sowing with the conventional package 
was approximately us$115 per hectare, whereas by combining genetically modified 
seeds and herbicide it fell to us$90, due to the reduction in labor’s (fundamentally, in 
the control of weeds) and biocides’ usage and the comparatively inferior increase in 
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seeds’ (as GMOs are more expensive than traditional products) and fertilizers’ 
expenditures5. 
Later, in 2002, the Convertibility Regime’s collapse, that determined the substitution of 
a fixed nominal exchange rate regime for a “dirty” floating regime, implied a price-
competitiveness6 gain for soybean producers, which was partially diminished by the 
reestablishment of export duties for these oilseeds7. Also, since 2003, the sustained 
increase in commodities’ international prices strengthened said competitiveness rise. 
Both macroeconomic factors (local and international) implied higher earnings for 
soybean producers, which in turn led to the deepening of GMOs usage in order to 
expand said activity’s production and exports. 
On summary, the study of the soybean case can provide evidence regarding how this 
activity was able to surpass innovation barriers that continue to be usual within the 
Argentine tradable sector and which were also customary for oilseeds producers up to 
the nineties, obstacles that are generated and/or enhanced by the volatility that 
characterizes the local macro economy. 
 
 
II.2. MAIN INNOVATION BARRIERS: 
Argentine industry’s innovative dynamics dealt (and still deals) with six fundamental 
restrictions during the nineties8, when GMOs’ rapid adoption started (Table II.1): long 
return period, innovation’s risks, difficulties regarding credit access, market’s size and 
structure and high innovation costs. 
                                                          
5 Aggregately, at the national level, the net income gain from GMOs adoption was about us$0,9 million in 
1996, rising to us$480 million in 2005 (Brookes and Barfoot, 2006). Cumulatively, the net income gain 
was us$6.250 million between 1996 and 2006 (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008).  
6 According to Bouzas and Fanelli (2001), competitiveness is defined by a non-price ingredient 
(productivity, scale and static comparative advantages) and a price component (that depends on factors’ 
dowry and on the exchange rate). 
7 This reform had the purpose of leveling different tradable activities’ profit margins, reducing price-
competitiveness to the activities that were located on the international frontier (whose performance, 
therefore, did not depend crucially on the real exchange rate’s raise). 
8 No data is available regarding barriers encountered by industrial companies in the new century. 
Nevertheless, the persistence of these obstacles during the nineties sustains the perception that they 
should have been relevant after 2001. 
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TABLE II.1. 
ARGENTINE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS’ INNOVATION BARRIERS. 1992-1996 / 1998-2001.  























* This percentage is a result of dividing answers that considered that each barrier had “high” or “medium” relevance by total 
answers. 
Source: Based  on data from Indec’s various Innovation Surveys. 
Notably, five of these six main innovation’s barriers (credit access, market’s size and 
structure and innovative costs and risks) were stronger for Small and Medium national 
manufacturing firms than for bigger companies (Table II.2). 
TABLE II.2. 
ARGENTINE INDUSTRIES’ INNOVATION BARRIERS BY FIRM SIZE. 1998-2001.  
As a share of total answers: 
Barrier Small Firms Medium Firms Big Firms
Difficulties regarding credit access 73,7 58,7 45,4
Market’s size 59,1 57,1 52,1
Market’s structure 55,6 54,5 49,5
High innovation costs 54,9 43,5 36,8
Long return period 49,3 55,8 60,4
Innovation risks 35,6 25,1 17,6  
Source: Based  on data from Indec (2003). 
Anyway, only one of these six barriers (credit access) was significant for agriculture 
firms’ innovative dynamics (Table II.3). Besides, productive scale was another 
notorious obstacle for farming sector’s innovation. As a result, while the former utilized 
conventional (and frequently obsolete) technologies, bigger farmers usually employed 
state of the art techniques (INTA, 2002). 
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TABLE II.3. 
ARGENTINE AGRICULTURE FIRMS’ INNOVATION BARRIERS. 2001.  














Inadequate land occupation 1,1  
Source: Based on data from INTA (2002). 
Therefore, as the majority of industrial barriers do not affect agriculture agents’ 
innovation, in general, and soybean producers’ technological upgrade, in particular, the 
rest of this section will be dedicated to identify the factors which have enabled oilseeds 
farmers to surpass the main obstacles manufacturing companies still deal with. 
 
• CREDIT ACCESS: 
Difficulties regarding credit access represented the main restriction for both domestic 
industry’s (Table II.1) and local agriculture’s (Table II.3) innovation process during the 
nineties, hurdle that was significantly stronger for small and medium manufacturing 
companies (Table II.2). Even more, although this obstacle’s weight is commonly 
countercyclical, its relevance in Argentina was constant throughout said decade. 
Remarkably, this barrier shows a smaller relevance in the rest of studied countries: in 
Italy, Netherlands and Belgium, it was the second factor in importance, whereas for 
Brazil and Spain, the third, and for Germany, the fourth. This evidence suggests credit 
rationing is especially deep in our country. 
Innovation investment has two financing sources. First, companies can use internally 
originated funds, like retained earnings and transfers from related firms. Secondly, they 
are able to access external financing sources provided by the banking system, the capital 
market, suppliers, clients and various public and private institutions and organizations. 
On that matter, during 2004, 82% of small and medium industries’ innovation 
investment was funded with internal resources, especially through the reinvestment of 
profits9. Meanwhile, the banking system (main external funding source) only financed 
9% of innovation expenditure carried out by Argentine manufacturing SMEs10. It is 
                                                          
9 There is no available data regarding small and medium farming agents, although it is possible to state 
that their access to bank’s credit is similar to industry’s. Nevertheless, as it shall be analyzed later, 
agriculture producers have a fluid funding from their providers and clients. 
10 As the local financial system is bank-based, innovative projects funded through capital markets are 
notoriously scarce. Therefore, this second external financing source will not be adressed in the rest of this 
section. 
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important to acknowledge that this internally based financial structure was similar 
during the nineties (Figure II.2). 
FIGURE II.2. 
SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRIES’ INNOVATION EXPENDITURE FINANCING 
STRUCTURE. 1998-2004. 
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Source: Based on data from Indec (2003 y 2006). 
Hurdles regarding external financing sources in Argentine agriculture and industry are a 
result of both supply’s and demand’s shortfalls. On the one side, the domestic banking 
system went through a significant restructuring process during the nineties, that was 
associated with the massive closing or acquisition of provincial, municipal and 
cooperative institutions (which were specialized in servicing the tradable sector), 
whereas “surviving” entities preferred to attend consumption’s and public sector’s 
funding needs (Albrieu and Fanelli, 2007). 
On the other side, credit demand is restricted by three causes: 1) self-financing 
preference (firms that do not need external resources or avoid them as a consequence of 
macroeconomic volatility11); 2) potential demand (companies that are not satisfied with 
current funding conditions as interest rates, repayment periods and collateral requests, 
but that would ask for finance if said terms changed); 3) red-liners (highly indebted 
firms that do not apply for credit as they would be inevitably denied by financial 
suppliers). 
The main adverse effect of this self-financing configuration is that innovation 
investments concretion does not depend on its importance (e.g. to take advantage of real 
exchange rate’s depreciation), but on the availability of internal funds to carry out said 
expenditures. Thus, the execution of strategic innovative projects must be delayed until 
firms collect sufficient resources as to deal with said costs, turning investment 
dependent on companies’ liquidity (Schiantarelli, 1996). Besides, as the gathering of 
                                                          
11 Due to the repeated occurrence of phases of intense reduction in activity levels, numerous SMEs that 
were indebted confronted difficulties to fulfill their financial commitments and, in diverse occasions, fell 
into bankruptcy by the weight of those liabilities. As a result, this group of firms chooses to self-finance 
investments, avoiding financial debts that could become unsustainable before a steep and intense 
macroeconomic recession. 
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internal funds requires an expanded lapse (since innovations are habitually onerous), 
this self-financing behavior magnifies the “defensive strategies” mentioned previously. 
Nevertheless, financing restrictions have not affected oilseeds producers, which have 
relied on suppliers’ resources to fund their investments. In particular, said sector’s 
financing, that had been scarcely and costly provided by banks in the early nineties, was 
outstandingly increased by the end of said decade when “Service Centers” developed. 
Notably, this new figure in Argentine farming was closely associated with the rapid and 
massive adoption of state of the art technologies like GMOs and “direct sowing”. 
Service Centers are selling places which concentrate not only the supply of GM seeds, 
fertilizers and agrochemicals but, also, provide ground analysis and technical advising 
services and, especially, financing. This companies are usually directly controlled by 
agriculture input producers, especially, the main international suppliers’ subsidiaries. 
These Centers developed during the last decade, when manufacturers of seeds, 
agrochemicals and fertilizers started creating exclusive or semi-exclusive distribution 
channels through the absorption of existing small and medium commercial firms. As the 
local market evolved towards a greater volume of inputs utilization, Service Centers 
incorporated the financing service. 
Nowadays, these firms have a centralized credit evaluation procedure for the greater 
clients (approximately 60% of total buyers), that is carried out by a risk analysis team. 
On the contrary, small producers’ funding risk is evaluated decentralizedly through the 
commercial channel. During the last years, Service Centers have funded nearly 80% of 
local input consumption, particularly through “exchange plans” that allow producers to 
pay with oilseeds after harvest (Alvarez, 2003). 
Finally, tractors and sowing and harvesting machines manufacturers tend to provide 
finance to their buyers. Especially, oilseeds cultivators are able to repay these debts 
after harvest (either with grains or with the money resulting from the commercialization 
of said goods), as their investment projects have a maturation period inferior to a year 
(in contrast with industrial innovations). 
 
• HIGH INNOVATION COSTS: 
Elevated costs constituted the second most notorious barrier for domestic manufacturing 
firms’ innovative dynamics during the nineties, restriction that was appreciably deeper 
for small and medium industries. On the contrary, this hurdle did not significantly 
weaken soybean producers’ innovation. 
Innovation costs, usually elevated, are especially high in Argentina due to local tradable 
firms’ preference for apprehending technology incorporated in machinery and 
equipment, pattern which is frequently more onerous (although less riskier) than 
endogenous knowledge creation or its assimilation through non incorporated exogenous 
sources. 
More so, the presence of comparatively superior costs in Argentina strengthens other 
innovation barriers. Particularly, credit restrictions (mentioned previously) become 
steeper when innovations costs are high, as firms have to delay their investments for a 
prolonged lapse until they are able to cumulate the internal funds necessary to self-
finance their projects. 
Since the second half of the nineties, the upsurge of “contractors” within Argentine 
agriculture has radically contributed to diminish said sector’s innovation costs. 
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Contractors provide machinery and equipment services (e.g. sowing, harvesting and 
fumigation) for farmers, especially for oilseeds producers. In this way, the latter are able 
to avoid elevated innovation costs associated with machinery and equipment 
investments12. 
Contractors are specialized in the ownership and administration of a productive factor 
(capital), diversifying risks (by working in different geographical areas) and exploiting 
tacit knowledge, financial capabilities (having credit access with both banks and 
machinery’s manufacturers) and strong relationships with other agriculture agents like 
Service Centers (Lódola, 2008). Nowadays, contractors harvest more than 60% of total 
sowed surface. 
Although contractors appeared in Argentine agriculture in the early 20th century, their 
relevance spread out during the last lustrum of the nineties, when “direct sowing” 
technique (which demanded more powerful, and thus more expensive, machines) and 
GMOs (that required agrochemical’s and fertilizers’ application services and allowed 
productive frontier’s expansion) became massive13. 
Besides, contractors contributed to alleviate financing restrictions, as they usually 
provide funding to their clients (including inputs like seeds, agrochemicals and 
fertilizers). Finally, contractors’ expansion facilitated the last technological leap’s rapid 
homogenization within cereals and oilseeds producers (Barsky and Gelman, 2001). 
Last, but not least, the cost of GM soybean for Argentine farmers has been substantially 
lower than in the United States, about us$4 per hectare compared to us$16, as the 
provider (Monsanto) was not able to obtain local patent protection for its technology14. 
Besides, Argentine farmers have also been allowed to reproduce GM seeds for their 
own usage by the local legislation: estimates of the proportion of total soybean used that 
derive from saved seeds in 2004 were up to 80% (Brookes and Barfoot, 2006). 
 
                                                          
12 According to Pucciarelli (1997), agriculture’s social and technical organization started mutating since 
the sixties, as farmers began assigning the majority of labors to contractors, avoiding capital goods’ 
purchases and workers’ direct hiring and retaining global production and commercialization process’ 
control and coordination. 
13 Contractors are clearly less relevant for Australian and American producers. In this respect, their 
importance in Argentina arose as a result of a causal combination: their historical development, capital 
market imperfections and farmers´ defensive strategies oriented to avoid onerous investments (Lódola, 
2008). 
14 The diffusion of soybean resistant to the herbicide glyphosate was started domestically by Asgrow 
Argentina (later acquired by Nidera), that obtained the license from Monsanto. As such, the latter could 
not patent their innovation, as it had been previously released, resigning their “technology fee” and the 
capacity of restricting the usage of producers’ own transgenic seeds (Trigo et al, 2002). 
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• INNOVATION’S RISKS AND RETURN PERIOD: 
Innovation’s risks and return period represented the third most relevant restriction for 
Argentine industry’s innovative dynamics during the nineties, hurdle that was 
significantly stronger for small and medium manufacturing companies. Notably, this 
barrier did not affect agriculture’s innovation. 
Innovation’s risk has both a macroeconomic (cyclical and symmetrical) and a 
microeconomic (structural and asymmetrical) component. As was stated previously, 
local macroeconomic volatility raises innovation risks, especially when macro regimes 
changes occur. In said contexts, local agents choose to postpone their innovative 
projects until they can make a profounder lecture of the new “rules of the game”. This 
risk is countercyclical, as when macroeconomic fundamentals stabilize, it dwindles. 
More so, this risk component has a symmetrical effect, affecting the whole tradable 
sector’s innovative investments. 
On the contrary, microeconomic innovation’s risk is structural and asymmetrical, since 
it is related to the type of projects firms carry out. On the one side, (medium)high-tech 
industries execute inherently more hazardous innovative projects. These companies, 
predominantly SMEs, have to endogenously develop new technologies, frequently 
associated with product innovations, for the reason that they can not significantly 
appraise them through exogenous knowledge sources (machinery and equipment, 
software, hardware, transfers and consultancies). Thus, this segment’s innovation entails 
internal R+D expenditures, design activities and reverse and adaptative engineering, 
which have a higher risk and, usually, a longer maturation period. 
On the other side, (medium)low-tech industries (e.g. Food and Beverage, Basic Metals, 
Petrochemistry, Paper) and the majority of farming branches (with the exception of 
cattle breeding, which can be included in the preceding group) are able to innovate 
almost exclusively via the adoption of exogenously generated technology15, either 
incorporated in machinery, equipment, software and productive inputs or 
unincorporated (external R+D, consultancies and transfers). This segment’s projects are 
usually connected with processes, transport and logistics innovations and production 
reorganizations. Obviously, the former investments have a considerably smaller risk and 
a shorter maturation period. 
Additionally, soybean producers count with the additional advantage that GMO’s usage 
has been actively promoted by Service Centers. In fact, these suppliers offer complete 
technological packages per oilseed articulated from GM seeds, which contain codified 
instructions regarding the adoption of specified products (agrochemicals and fertilizers) 
and agronomical practices. Usually, these packages include counseling services on the 
subject of associated cultivation techniques, thus reducing ostensibly this innovation’s 
risk. Consequently, these packages diminish farmers’ discretionality when selecting 
their production function, partly transferring that decision towards Service Centers 
(Alvarez, 2003). More so, these commercialization agents conform a national 
technology and knowledge diffusion network (Bisang, 2001). 
Finally, non-profit organizations (e.g. AACREA –technology supporter- and 
AAPRESID –direct sowing promoter-) and private institutions integrated by farming 
                                                          
15This unbalanced innovative investment’s structure determines an inferior positive effect on these firms’ 
competitiveness, since weak efforts are made regarding the generation of incremental knowledge, in order 
to adapt the external technology to the idiosyncratic features of local human and entrepreneurial 
resources. 
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businessmen (e.g. ACSOJA -soybean producers-) have had (and still do) an active role 
regarding innovation’s encouragement and development in oilseeds cultivation, thus 
diminishing these investments’ risks. 
 
• MARKET’S SIZE AND STRUCTURE: 
Market’s size and structure constituted the fourth most relevant barrier for local 
industry’s innovative dynamics during the nineties, hurdle that was ostensibly tougher 
for small and medium manufacturing firms. Again, this restriction did not disturb 
significantly either agriculture’s or soybean producers’ innovation. 
This barrier’s effect on innovation is linked to said investment’s profitability. On the 
one side, innovative projects have a potentially higher gain when firms participate in a 
bigger market (as the former are more easily amortized) and enjoy a certain amount of 
market power (as they could translate to prices eventual additional costs). On the other 
side, innovations are usually less profitable when companies partake in smaller market 
(as it is more difficult to amortize investments) and lack market power (as they are 
unable to translate additional costs to prices). 
(Medium)high-tech manufacturing firms, excluding Automotive and Petrochemical 
industries, habitually attend a small fraction of the narrow domestic market (as they 
have small export levels) and lack market power (due to an intense competition with 
imported goods that take advantage of lower input costs or better technological 
standards). More so, their profitability is frequently threatened as a result of their 
monopolical/oligopolical suppliers’ (especially basic input manufacturers) dependence. 
On the contrary, oilseed producers participate in big markets, as they not only provide 
local demand but, also, have a significant presence in foreign markets16. Besides, 
although these agents are price-takers as exporters, they exploit their market power 
locally, advantage which is founded in their productive structure as 
monopolies/oligopolies. 
Finally, non-exporting firms have to deal with a domestic market that is not only small 
but, also, highly volatile. Hence, said volatility encourages defensive strategies amongst 
(medium)high-tech industries, as domestic demand often shrinks while investments 
mature, making innovative expenditures’ amortization strongly improbable. In fact, 
many manufacturing companies that had awaited until 1997/1998 for the domestic 
market to be big enough to turn innovations profitable, were unable to amortize their 
investments when local economy entered a recessive phase and, thus, fell into 
bankruptcy (Bernat, 2009). 
 
                                                          
16 In this respect, some published studies (Yoguel and Rabertino, 2000; Chudnovsky et al, 2006) found a 
positive relationship between exports and innovation. 
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• FIRM SIZE: 
The previously analyzed innovation barriers do not affect big firms and SMEs equally 
(Table II.2). In particular, larger companies are usually able to overcome these hurdles. 
In this respect, the former have access to various funding sources, both internal (related 
firm’s transfers) and external (national/foreign banking and capital markets, suppliers, 
multinational organisms, Governments); face comparatively smaller innovation costs 
(as they take advantage of large cash flows) and risks (as they have both better 
information to “read” macroeconomic tendencies and solider patrimonies with which to 
affront eventual projects failures); participate in bigger markets (as a result of a 
considerable presence in external markets); and, at least locally, exploit their market 
power (due to their configuration as monopolies or oligopolies)17. 
Within Argentine industry, big firms predominate in Food an Beverage, Steel, 
Aluminum, Paper, Automobiles and Petrochemicals manufacturing. The former have 
innovated during the last decades in order to retain their positions above the 
international state of the art frontier and, in the automotive industry’s case, to rapidly 
converge to said technological border (Bernat, 2008). On the contrary, SMEs prevail in 
(medium)low-tech manufacturing activities, like Machinery, Medical equipment and 
Rest of transport equipment production. These sectors have permanently dealt with 
mentioned restrictions and, with a few exceptions, have not been able to reach global 
state of the art. 
As Table II.3 showed, agriculture’s innovation is also affected by firm’s size, as a 
limited productive scale was the main innovative dynamics’ barrier for 10,6% of total 
farming companies. Nevertheless, the upsurge of new productive agents allowed 
soybean producers to surpass said hurdle. 
During the early nineties, “Sowing Pools” and “Direct Investment Funds” (DIF) arose 
with the objective of increasing productive scale without concentrating land ownership 
(which is significantly atomized in Argentina). Sowing Pools are associations in which 
proprietors rent their lands to farming labors administration companies, that carry out 
production with both their own funds and capitals from clients or investors (often 
external to the primary sector). In spite of a great heterogeneity in terms of sizes and 
legal forms, the conformation of a Sowing Pool requires the involvement of three 
agents: 1) land owners, 2) a technical consultant or agronomist, and 3) investors 
(Ghezán et al, 2001).  
Direct Investment Funds differ from Sowing Pools mainly due to their stronger legal 
base, that requires the participation of considerably more actors: 1) investors; 2) capital 
market’s agents (responsible for selling the participations in the DIF); 3) organizer or 
technical operator (in charge of production); 4) societal manager or administrator; 5) 
auditor and 6) land owners (IICA, 1997). 
Regarding innovation, both productive organizations are able to take advantage of scale 
economies and to diminish climatic and economic risks. In the first case, they exploit 
their productive scales to cheapen their technology access from input and capital goods 
providers, increasing innovative investments’ profit margins (third most relevant 
restriction according to Table II.3).  
                                                          
17 This statement is in line with Schumpeter’s latest hypothesis (1942), that established that bigger 
oligopolical firms have an advantage to carry out formal R+D activities, in opposition to said author’s 
first hypothesis (1934), which affirmed that small entrepreneurs are the key actors in the innovative 
process. 
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In the second case, both diversify geographical areas and crops, growing mainly 
soybean, sunflower, wheat and maize in Argentina’s most productive region 
(“nucleus”), but also cultivating sorghum, cotton, peanut and forages in marginal zones 
(like the North East). Besides, due to the presence of highly qualified technical 
consultants, these agglomerations cumulate the necessary skills to implement 
technological upgrade (second most important hurdle for farmers). 
As a result, these associations have been able to surpass several innovation barriers, 
converging to the global state of the art. Unfortunately, domestic macroeconomic 
volatility has limited the development of both agents in farming productions that have 
longer maturation periods, like fruits growing and cattle breeding (Nava, 2003). 
 
III. SOYBEAN PRODUCERS’ INNOVATION MICRO AND 
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS: 
III.1. MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS: 
Logically, the adoption of GMOs implied the growth of soybean cultivation’s 
productivity, therefore increasing this activity’s non-price-competitiveness (which was 
historically elevated as a result of the existence of natural static comparative 
advantages). In fact, average yields augmented from a range between 2,0 and 2,3 tons 
per seeded hectare in the early nineties, to nearly 3,0 tons per sowed hectare during the 
last two campaigns (Figure III.1). 
FIGURE III.1. 
SOYBEAN’S AVERAGE YIELD. 1990-2008. 





































































































Source: Based on data from the Argentine Agriculture Secretary. 
More so, the rise in the level of said indicator was attenuated by the diffusion of “double 
sowing” and the expansion of soybean production towards regions of smaller yields, 
both of which determined a partial fall in the mean productivity. In that way, yields 
grew substantially in the Nucleus Region (the most fertile lands), although its national 
average augmented comparatively less as a result of soybean cultivation’s extension 
towards fringe areas (like the Argentine North East) and as a consequence of this 
oilseed’s increasing role as a second crop. 
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Additionally, the surface sowed with soybean enhanced significantly since the 
introduction of GMOs, growing from approximately 6,0 million hectares in the middle 
nineties to 16,6 million hectares in the 2007/2008 campaign (Figure III.2). On the one 
hand, this process was related to the explosive surface expansion in non traditional 
soybean producing Provinces, like Entre Ríos and Santiago del Estero. On the other 
hand, the “double sowing” system allowed for this rise, as the dimension of the surface 
destined to cultivate soybean as a second crop augmented from 0,5 million hectares in 
1996 to nearly 3 million hectares during the present decade. 
FIGURE III.2. 
SURFACE SOWED WITH SOYBEAN. 1990-2008. 






































































































Source: Based on data from the Argentine Agriculture Secretary. 
Naturally, the conjunction between yields’ increase and surface’s expansion implied a 
continuous enhancement in soybean primary production, that augmented from 12,0 
million tons in the middle nineties to 47,5 million tons in the 2006/2007 campaign and 
46,2 million tons in the 2007/2008 campaign (Figure III.3), achieving an average 
annual growth rate of 13,3% during the last decade. 
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FIGURE III.3. 
SOYBEAN PRIMARY PRODUCTION. 1990-2008. 
Million of tons: 
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Source: Based on data from the Argentine Agriculture Secretary. 
Finally, as both beans and its sub products have a weak domestic demand, the 
systematic increase in this oilseed production allowed for the continuous growth in 
these goods’ exports, that rose from a total of 12,1 million tons in 1996 to 44,2 million 
tons in 2007 (Figure III.4). In turn, this result allowed for the expansion of the local 
soybean complex’s participation in external markets, reality that contrasted with the (on 
occasions failed) efforts of diverse Argentine manufacturing branches to gain 
productivity in order to dispute the internal market with imports. 
FIGURE III.4. 
SOYBEAN EXPORTS (INCLUDING BEANS, OILS AND SUB PRODUCTS). 1990-2008. 

































































Source: Based on data from Indec. 
Nevertheless, in 2008, a failed increase in export duties originated an extended conflict 
between soybean producers and the Government, which (in conjunction with primary 
production’s fall) explained the diminishment of exports registered in said year (minus 
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4,3 million tons). The implemented strategy of temporarily delaying soybean sales was 
made possible by the diffusion of the “silo-bags” storage technology, innovation that 
was created precisely to allow farmers to regulate their trade in the short term, in order 
to protect them against cyclical fluctuations in the internal and foreign markets’ 
conditions (Bisang, 2007). 
 
III.2. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS: 
It is possible to establish three basic links between soybean innovative and productive 
dynamics and the Argentine macroeconomy (Albrieu and Bernat, 2008): (a) changes in 
external sustainability; (b) variations in fiscal sustainability; and (c) effects in inflation. 
Naturally, although this section will focus exclusively in the three links mentioned 
above, it is not possible to ignore that the evolution of this activity had other 
consequences, such as changes in labor demand and the emergence of dualism within 
the agricultural sector18. 
Regarding the first link between soybean’s evolution and macroeconomy, due to a 
symmetrical increase in quantities and international prices, the dollar value of soybean’s 
exports (including beans, oils and sub products) triplicated between 2002 and 2008, 
increasing from us$5.035 million to us$16.577 million in that period (Figure III.5). 
FIGURE III.5. 
SOYBEAN EXPORTS (INCLUDING BEANS, OILS AND SUB PRODUCTS). 2002-2008. 
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Source: Based on data from Indec. 
The consequent positive effect of said evolution on global exports improved sensibly 
local macroeconomic external sustainability. Since Díaz Alejandro’s (1970) seminal 
work on domestic economic history, several authors have pointed out that one of the 
main problems Argentina faces in trying to achieve a high long run growth rate is its 
                                                          
18 Regarding the former, there is no consensus: some authors argue that the effects of soybean’s dynamics 
are positive (Llach et al., 2005; Bisang, 2007), while others state just the opposite (Rodriguez, 2005). 
Regarding the latter, there is evidence that it has not been easy to replicate the high productivity 
soybean’s pattern in other branches of the agriculture sector (Teubal and Giarraca, 2005; Bernat and 
Corso, 2008). 
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external (balance of payments) constraint. More precisely, potential output cannot be 
achieved because the exportable sector fails to provide enough dollars to buy the needed 
imported machinery and related inputs. As a result, once the country is growing fast, the 
trade balance turns negative and the growth process stops. Nevertheless, during the last 
six years, the soybean sector has provided a steady positive trade result, that averaged 
us$.6500 million19 and that explained more than 100% of the global Argentine 
persistent current account surplus (Figure III.6). 
FIGURE III.6. 
SOYBEAN TRADE BALANCE (INCLUDING BEANS, OILS AND SUB PRODUCTS) AND 
ARGENTINE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS. 2002-2008. 











































Source: Based on data from Indec. 
Regarding the second channel, in Argentine recurrent macroeconomic crises, there was 
continuously a problem of “external transfer”, in the sense that the economy as a whole 
has been unable to pay its external obligations. There was also a problem of “domestic 
transfer”, as the agent who had the obligation to pay the external debt had to first 
manage to get the foreign currency from other domestic agents. More specifically, the 
Government has been historically the debtor and the exportable sector, the provider of 
foreign currency. 
In 2002, export duties were reestablished for beans, oils and sub products, which, after 
some later adjustments, were fixed at levels over FOB values of 35%, 32% and 32%, 
respectively. Notably, revenues associated with export duties on soybean and its 
byproducts increased from $2.012 in 2002 to $9.502 in 2007 and to $14.557 in 2008, 
explaining 36,9% of the National Government’s fiscal primary surplus in 2007 and 
41,7% during the last year (Figure III.7). 
                                                          
19 The local vegetable oil industry imported us$1.345 million in beans during 2008, in order to avoid the 
diminishment of local sales originated by the conflict between producers and the Government and, 
consequently, utilize the maximum of their installed capacity. 
 21
FIGURE III.7. 
REVENUES IN CONCEPT OF SOYBEAN EXPORT DUTIES (INCLUDING BEANS, OILS AND 
SUB PRODUCTS) AND ARGENTINE PRIMARY SURPLUS. 2002-2008. 










































Source: Based on data from the Argentine Finance Ministry. 
Last, the third channel relating soybean’s innovative performance with macroeconomic 
conditions is through inflation, phenomenon that is damaging because it affects 
negatively key social indicators, such as poverty and income distribution. In this 
respect, many of the products that contribute to the local exports basket (e.g. meat, 
maize and wheat), which have risen their domestic prices in the last years, have a 
preponderant role in the basic consumption basket. It is important to acknowledge that 
this is not the case of soybean, whose participation in the basic food basket is practically 
null. 
Nevertheless, soybean’s constant trade surpluses has determined a continuous excess 
supply of dollars in the domestic market, which, in turn, led the Government to 
implement active policies in order to maintain the real exchange rate at competitive 
levels. By all means, the cost of this policy was not null: the need to buy the excess 
supply of foreign currency had a counterpart in the rapid expansion of domestic 
liquidity, which required active policies as well, regarding the sterilization of the 
inflationary component of the monetary base’s increase. Consequently, the decision to 
control the nominal exchange rate and, by this mean, the real exchange rate at a 
competitive level, has generated repressed inflation. Thus, the positive and relatively 
high rate of inflation that is currently observed in Argentina is closely related to the 
reaction of the monetary authority to the significant surplus in trade balance engendered 
as a result of soybean’s innovative dynamics. 
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
During the last decade, soybean production showed a high rate of innovation, as 
domestic farmers adopted state of the art technologies associated with biotechnology 
(herbicide tolerant varieties) without important lags regarding their international launch. 
This sector’s high speed of assimilation of global innovations contrasted notoriously 
with the pattern observed for the rest of the primary activities and the majority of 
manufacturing branches. Therefore, the study of soybean’s case became essential in 
trying to understand this innovative dualism. More specifically, one of the purposes of 
this paper was to identify the factors that impelled this development and draw lessons 
for the rest of the local economy, in order to transmit the high innovation pattern to the 
whole tradable sector. 
In Argentina, tradable sector’s innovation faces several barriers that are engendered 
and/or enhanced by macroeconomic volatility and that promote the adoption of 
“defensive strategies”, restricting or delaying investment projects’ implementation. On 
this matter, this paper showed that soybean production has been able to surpass 
mentioned restrictions during the last decade. As it was analyzed previously, the former 
activities’ innovative dynamics counted with the collaboration of its providers 
(machinery, inputs, contractors), clients (Food and Beverage industries), investors 
(sowing pools and Direct Investment Funds) and different private organizations20. 
More so, soybean production is nowadays organized in network systems, that imply 
coordination between such diverse actors as farmers, suppliers, clients, investors, 
workers, technicians and science and technology institutions. These networks allow the 
improvement of each link’s profits through formal or informal contracts, which specify 
not only transactions’ financial conditions and prices but, also, include tangible and 
intangible flows of information, productive experiences and knowledge (Bisang and 
Kosacoff, 2006). 
Consequently, the study of the soybean case revealed that innovation is usually not an 
individual (and frequently incremental) behavior’s result, but a collective processes’ 
consequence (Yoguel et al, 2006). In soybean’s experience, the own agents’ (farmers, 
suppliers, clients and private organizations) coordination was enough to promote 
innovation. Contrarily, in (medium)high-tech manufacturing activities and beef and 
apple production, firms have not been able to surpass obstacles by themselves (Bernat 
and Corso, 2008). 
Regarding microeconomics, as a result of a decade of continuous innovation, soybean 
managed to constitute itself in the national sector with the best external integration. In 
fact, between 1996 and 2008, the primary production of oilseeds grew from 12 million 
tons to 46 million, whereas exports increased from 12 million tons to 40 million. In that 
way, Argentina transformed into the leading exporter of soybean’s oil and flour, 
consolidating the main worldwide pole of oilseed production in the environs of Rosario 
(Province of Santa Fe). 
Regarding macroeconomics, this innovative dynamics had two positive effects and one 
negative consequence. On the one hand, during the last six years, the soybean’s sector 
steady trade surplus, that averaged us$.6500 million, explained more than 100% of the 
persistent national current account surplus, while the reestablished export duties on 
                                                          
20 This segment’s innovation is not observed by R+D based international comparisons, as these firms’ 
innovate primarily through the adoption of exogenous knowledge incorporated in inputs and machinery. 
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beans, oils and sub products generated revenues that explained 41,7% of National 
Government’s fiscal primary surplus in 2008. On the other hand, the monetary policy 
carried out by local authorities to avoid the real exchange rate appreciation associated to 
the systematic current account surplus represented one of the main causes that generated 
a positive and relatively high rate of inflation. 
However, recent soybean’s dynamics has exhibited three weaknesses which are 
important to state. First, the irruption of soybean tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate 
implied a significant change in the model of diffusion of innovations within local 
agriculture, since this transgenic was propagated directly by the subsidiaries of seeds’ 
producers multinationals. On the contrary, the role of the INTA (Agricultural 
Technology National Institute), that had carried out the spreading of innovations during 
the previous fifty years, declined significantly, as biotechnology implies high 
investments in R+D and this public center suffered the loss of its resources and the 
reorientation of its activities against basic investigation. 
Due to the transformation mentioned above, our country is nowadays a “fast follower” 
of the advances generated world-wide. Therefore, the innovative development of local 
soybean production depends on the (pecuniary) interests of seeds’ subsidiaries to spread 
the new technologies. This dynamics offers a high power to multinational seeds 
producers, as they can charge high prices or, by default, forbid national farmers from 
technological advances. In this sense, the present dispute between Argentina and 
Monsanto is a paradigmatic case. Independently of the suitability of the company’s 
argument, a final solution that does not satisfy its objectives could mean the exclusion 
of national producers from the new varieties of transgenic cultures developed by the 
firm. 
Additionally, it is relevant to take into account that the fast diffusion of transgenic 
soybean has been feasible in our country due to some exceptional conditions, mainly the 
impossibility to patent locally this innovation (which reduced the price of herbicide 
tolerant seeds) and the high adaptability of the culture. Consequently, when new 
varieties demand higher expenses to be adapted to certain regions (characterized by 
worse climatic conditions) or types of producers, the propagation of innovations could 
be significantly smaller. 
One second weakness of this innovative process consisted in the lack of advance  
towards the construction of new links in the soybean value chain (for example, 
nutritional products of high added value based on this oilseed’s flour). The 
concentration of exports in food commodities (beans, oils and flour) implies that the 
yield of primary and secondary production is notoriously exposed to the volatility of 
international prices. This risk is considerably greater for small primary producers, that 
lack the financial capacity necessary to confront a prolonged cycle of low international 
prices. 
Finally, the third fragility of soybean’s innovative process resides in the weakening of 
primary producers’ relation with their national suppliers of seeds, agrochemicals, 
fertilizers and machinery. In this respect, the diffusion of genetically modified soybean 
caused a transformation in the supplying system, since subsidiaries began to 
commercialize “technological packages”. Consequently, the participation of national 
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